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ABSTRACT 
Policy concertation, defined as making policy by means of agreements struck between government 
officials and representatives of employer associations and trade unions, is a major policy style in 
Western Europe. This article seeks to explain the political dynamics of policy concertation in terms 
of the varying configurations of three variables: perceived problems, the degree of shared economic 
understanding among the participants, and the perceived implementation capacity of the 
participants. It is found that the incidence of broad policy concertation over the 20th century in nine 
West European countries can be almost completely explained in terms of this configurational theory. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Although the idea of employers and unions participating in the making of public policy sounds 
strange to British ears, elsewhere in Western Europe public policy is often made by means of 
agreements struck between government officials and representatives of employer associations and 
WUDGH XQLRQV 7KLV SUDFWLFH ZKLFK FDQ EH WHUPHG µSROLF\ FRQFHUWDWLRQ¶ WR GLVWLQJXLVK LW IURP WKH
more pluralist policy-making characteristic of Britain and other Anglo-Saxon countries, is 
significant because it affects the content of public policy and therefore the shape of the society we 
live in. Because decisions are taken by agreement, each participant has a power of veto and is 
therefore guaranteed influence over the decision. This rules out policy decisions that are 
unacceptable to employers or trade unions. It also leads governments to introduce policies that they 
would not otherwise have introduced, in exchange for concessions from employers and unions. In 
certain cases, the political exchange of policy concertation may render feasible policy options not 
previously open to the government, such as expansionary economic policies dependent on wage 
restraint. 
Policy concertation in Western Europe during the 1990s included social pacts, agreements struck 
within the regular state policy-making apparatus between representatives of business, labour and the 
state, and the implementation by the state of bipartite employer-union agreements. It is most 
common in the fields of employment and social policy, but in some countries encompasses 
significant areas of economic policy as well. This broad policy concertation has been associated 
historically with countries such as Austria, with its Social Partnership, as well as with the 
Netherlands and Sweden, but the breadth of policy areas covered by policy concertation also varies 
over time: during the 1990s broad policy concertation was still characteristic of Austria, for 
example, but had ceased to exist in the Netherlands and Sweden while becoming established in 
Ireland and Italy (Table 1).  
Why does the range of public policy codetermined by policy concertation vary between countries 
and over time? The purpose of this article is to answer this question.1  
My starting point is the limited success of theories that use a distinctive corporatist logic to explain 
the incidence of broad policy concertation in recent years. Not all corporatist theories are devoted to 
explaining policy concertation, of course. Some seek to explain phenomena such as economic policy 
and economic outcomes (eg Cameron 1984, Crepaz 1992, Woldendorp 1997), while others focus on 
explicating corporatism as a state of affairs (eg Lijphart and Crepaz 1991, Keman and Pennings 
1995, Siaroff 1999). And those theories that are designed to explain policy concertation often use 
GLIIHUHQW WHUPV WR UHIHU WR LW LQFOXGLQJ WKH WHUP µFRUSRUDWLVP¶ LWVHOI HJ /HKPEUXFK 
Woldendorp 1997). 
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Table 1. Policy Concertation in Western Europe, 1990-1997 
Country Policy areas covered 
Wide-concertation countries with frequent concertation 
Austria  Social policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy, investment policy, industrial policy, 
social welfare, labour law, job-creation and training, employment, EU-issues 
Wide-concertation countries with sporadic concertation 
Ireland  Overall macro-economic policy strategy, social welfare, government spending in 
general, employment policy including active labour market policy, regional policy 
Medium-concertation countries with sporadic concertation 
Italy  Taxation, expenditure (especially pensions), labour law 
Narrow-concertation countries with frequent concertation 
Netherlands Social security, employment policy 
Sweden Many sectors until 1992, then restricted to labour market policy and pensions 
Germany Social insurance, labour law, health, reconstruction of the East 
Narrow-concertation countries with sporadic concertation 
Spain Employment law and social security  
France Employment law and social security  
Non-concertation countries 
Britain None 
Source: Berger and Compston 2002, political country chapters. 
 
Arguably the most influential theory of policy concertation that does utilise a corporatist logic of 
explanation starts with the proposition that the existence of corporatist systems of interest 
LQWHUPHGLDWLRQ LQ 6FKPLWWHU¶V RULJLQDO VHQVH 6FKPLWWHU   PHDQV WKDW WKH RUJDQLVDWLons 
involved can no longer externalise the economic costs of their actions. If a trade union in a single 
industry makes excessive wage claims, it may be possible for employers in that industry to pass 
these on in the form of higher prices to the rest of society, but if a union movement that 
HQFRPSDVVHVPRVWRIDQDWLRQ¶VZRUNIRUFHPDNHVH[FHVVLYHZDJHFODLPVWKHUHVXOWDQWSULFHULVHVKLW
everyone, including union members. For this reason, encompassing union movements are expected 
to be more open to negotiating wage restraint than smaller or divided movements, which encourages 
governments to enter policy concertation with the intent of offering policy concessions in exchange 
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for wage restraint (Calmfors 1993, Olson 1982). Corporatism is also expected to facilitate 
negotiations by limiting the number of participants and by giving to leaders of trade union 
confederations and employer peak associations the ability to make the binding commitments on 
behalf of their members that are essential if political exchange is to take place on a continuing basis 
(Lehmbruch 1979: 167-168, Slomp 1992: 163, Crouch 1993: 54-55, 289).  
The problem with this model is that it fails to account for the incidence of broad policy concertation 
in Western Europe in the 1990s. Although it can explain the persistence of broad policy concertation 
in Austria, where the compulsory Chamber system is as close to an ideal-type corporatist system as 
exists in Western Europe, it cannot explain its rise in Ireland, where the distribution of power within 
employer associations and trade unions is relatively decentralised, or its resurgence in Italy, where 
employer associations and trade union confederations are institutionally divided.  
There are a number of other theories of policy concertation that utilise conceptions of corporatism as 
explanatory variables, but these generally go beyond the corporatist logic of explanation to include 
other explanatory variables as well. A number of such variables have been cited in the political 
economy literature. These include the postwar emergence of a willingness on the part of 
governments to trade policy concessions for certain commitments by employers and/or trade unions 
due to the postwar extension of the role of government in managing the economy, labour party 
participation in government, economic openness, consociationalism, economic consensus, 
egalitarian political cultures, degree of societal support, the relationship of organised groups to 
modernisation in previous centuries, and the extensive institutionalisation of contacts between 
employers, trade unions and the state (for a review of these theories see Compston 1998, 2002).  
Rather than criticising these theories, a number of which have considerable explanatory power, what 
I wish to do here is to offer a new theory of policy concertation that also goes beyond the logic of 
corporatism by utilising different independent variables and a different logic of explanation, a theory 
that provides a parsimonious explanation of the incidence of broad policy concertation since 1945 
that is at least as compelling as the accounts offered by existing theories. This configurational theory 
explains broad policy concertation in terms of the changing configurations of values of just three 
variables: the nature of contemporary problems as perceived by the government; the degree of pre-
existent shared understanding of the aims and mechanisms of economic policy among governments, 
employers and unions; and expectations about the likelihood that the prospective participants will 
implement their sides of any agreements reached.  
The first part of the article is devoted to describing this configurational theory and how it works. The 
second part uses the findings of a major international study of policy concertation to illustrate how 
the political dynamics of broad policy concertation in Western Europe since 1945 can be almost 
completely accounted for in terms of the shifting configurations of values of the three explanatory 
variables. 
A CONFIGURATIONAL MODEL OF POLICY CONCERTATION 
7KH PRGHO RI SROLF\ FRQFHUWDWLRQ VHW RXW EHORZ LV LQVSLUHG E\ -RKQ .LQJGRQ¶V WKHRU\ RI DJHQGD-
setting, in which items are seen as coming up for decision when simultaneously a compelling 
problem is recognised, a solution in the form of a technically and politically feasible policy proposal 
is available, political change makes politicians receptive, and potential constraints are not too severe 
.LQJGRQ  $SSO\LQJ .LQJGRQ¶V DSSURDFK WR D GLIIHUHQW GHSHQGHQW YDULDEOH UHVXOWV LQ D
different theory, but the logic is the same in that both posit that the value of the dependent variable 
is determined by the coincidence in time of specific configurations of events and conditions. 
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The essence of the configurational theory is as follows. Existing modes of policy-making tend to 
persist unless challenged by a serious problem with which they cannot cope. Where this problem is 
perceived to be one that arguably could be solved by policy concertation, there will be pressure to 
introduce this new mode of policy-making, but policy concertation will only occur in practice if at 
the same time there is a certain degree of pre-existent shared understanding of the aims and 
mechanisms of economic policy, and the prospective participants are perceived to be reasonably 
likely to implement their sides of any agreements reached. This explanatory logic can be extended to 
identify the conditions under which policy concertation is prevented from taking place or, once 
established, either persists over time or is terminated.  
In this section, policy concertation - the dependent variable - is given its operational definition, the 
three key independent variables are described, and the logic and predictions of the theory are set out 
in detail. 
Dependent variable 
7KH WHUP µSROLF\ FRQFHUWDWLRQ¶ LV GHILQHG IRU DQDO\WLFDO SXUSRVHV DV QDWLRQDO-level discussions 
between government representatives and representatives of peak employer and/or trade union 
confederations that lead to agreements on public policy, that is, to government commitments to 
adopt particular policies, as opposed to discussions that do not lead to such commitments: the focus 
is on codetermination of public policy, as opposed to mere consultation. More specifically, the 
object of interest is policy concertation over a broad range of public policy, defined as concertation 
that covers a broader range of public policy than its core areas of  employment and social policy. 
Broad policy concertation thus defined takes four main forms: decision by agreement within 
government committees; formal tripartite or government-union agreements such as social pacts; 
informal agreements; and the implementation by the state of bipartite employer-union agreements. 
Incomes policies are included insofar as they include government commitments on public policy.  
Independent variables 
The three key explanatory variables are perceived problems, the degree of pre-existent shared 
economic understanding among policy actors, and the perceived likelihood of implementation. All 
of these vary between countries and over time. Although I do not wish to deny the existence of 
relevant causal variables other than these, the theory to be tested implies that all other causal 
variables are either relatively unimportant, fit into the model as intervening variables, or operate 
through the three proximate causal variables specified by the configurational theory, on the rationale 
that the incidence of broad policy concertation can be adequately explained without reference to any 
of them. 
1. Perceived problems 
The first proposition is that the spur for governments to consider extending policy concertation to 
new areas is the appearance of problems with which existing modes of policy-making are not coping 
adequately, especially economic problems. The main economic difficulty that is hypothesised to lead 
governments to contemplate policy concertation is inflation where the government sees this as being 
at least partly fuelled by wage rises, on the grounds that concern to control wages leads governments 
to consider offering policy concessions in exchange for wage restraint. Although economists always 
worry about inflation, the extent to which it is seen by governments as a pressing problem varies. 
Inflation may be perceived as an urgent problem because it is high in an absolute sense, because it is 
high relative to other countries even though low in absolute terms (the competitiveness criterion), or 
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because its salience is increased by the presence of other economic problems, such as the need for 
postwar reconstruction.  
Because it is perceptions of the economy that are important here, and governments at different times 
and places may have different perceptions of the extent to which a given objective state of economic 
affairs constitutes a problem, the relevant indicator of economic difficulties is not an objective 
measure, such as the actual rate of inflation, but an indicator of perceptions of the seriousness of 
economic problems. This is provided by the evaluations of country experts.  
2. Shared economic understanding 
The second proposition of the configurational theory is that policy concertation is facilitated by a 
certain degree of pre-existent shared understanding among the government, employers and trade 
unions about the general aims and mechanisms of economic policy (as distinct from the specifics of 
economic policy). It is difficult to specify all the aspects of economic policy on which this pre-
existent shared economic understanding is necessary, especially since this may vary from time to 
time and from country to country, but two minimum criteria can be readily identified.  
First, all political actors must accept capitalism. If trade unions or socialist governments are actively 
trying to overthrow the capitalist system, sustained policy concertation with employers would not be 
expected to take place. This means that where there are genuinely socialist or communist 
governments or unions, broad policy concertation would not be expected to take place.  
Second, all political actors must accept the legitimacy of trade unions and collective bargaining. If 
employers or governments do not, then not only would it be difficult to obtain the wage restraint 
often desired by governments and employers in exchange for policy concessions, since the 
coordination of wage rises via collective bargaining would be rendered impossible, but in addition 
the degree of hostility and distrust between employers and unions would be likely to prevent 
agreement anyway. This means that broad policy concertation is not expected to take place where 
employers or  governments hold radical right-wing views of either the liberal or authoritarian 
variety.  
Beyond these minimum criteria, concertation on economic policy is expected to be more likely 
where all political actors, including unions, agree in principle that wage restraint is desirable for 
economic reasons. Other relevant factors include the extent to which all actors, including unions, 
subscribe to a philosophy of low inflation and international competitiveness, as distinct from mere 
acceptance of capitalism, and how tolerant employers are of economic planning, which is often of 
interest to unions and left-of-centre governments.  
Precise measurement of the degree of shared understanding of the aims and mechanisms of 
economic policy, and how it varies over time, is difficult. The measure used in this article is 
provided by the evaluations of country experts. 
3. Perceived likelihood of implementation  
The final provision of the configurational theory is that broad policy concertation will only take 
place if participants believe that their counterparts are reasonably likely to implement their sides of 
any agreements reached, as otherwise confidence in the efficacy of these agreements will be 
undermined and policy actors will refuse to take part. It is here that corporatist theory is relevant, as 
implementation of promises would be expected to be easier where employer associations and trade 
union confederations are large, centralised and disciplined, and where collective bargaining is 
coordinated, preferably on a national basis.  
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Ultimately, however, perceptions of future implementation are determined not only by these 
structural factors but also by more contingent factors, such as whether previous agreements were 
implemented properly and the degree of trust between leaders. For this reason the appropriate 
indicator of perceived implementation capacity is not organisational structure but expert evaluation 
of the opinions of the relevant policy actors at the time.  
Logic and predictions 
The incidence of broad policy concertation is hypothesised to be a function of the configuration of 
values of the three variables of the configurational theory. Four possible states of being for broad 
policy concertation can be distinguished: creation, persistence having been created earlier, 
termination, and non-existence. Each of these conditions can be explained in terms of one or more 
configurations of the three explanatory variables. The resulting causal hypotheses are as follows: 
1. The creation of broad policy concertation is caused by the combination of (1) the recognition of 
a serious relevant problem; (2) considerable pre-existent agreement on the aims and mechanisms of 
economic policy; and (3) the perception that prospective participants are reasonably likely to 
implement their sides of agreements. 
2. The persistence of broad policy concertation is caused by the combination of (1) the solution or 
disappearance of the problem it was designed to solve where it is feared that an end to concertation 
might lead to its reappearance; (2) the continuation of a considerable degree of agreement on 
economic policy; and (3) a continuing perception that prospective participants will implement their 
sides of agreements, based at least in part on their record in implementing previous agreements. 
3. The termination of broad policy concertation is caused by one or more of the following: (1) the 
continued existence of the original relevant problem or the appearance of another serious relevant 
problem (since both these instances imply policy failure); (2) the emergence of serious 
disagreements on economic policy; or (3) a perception, possibly based on previous implementation 
failures, that participants are not likely to implement their sides of future agreements. 
4. The non-existence of broad policy concertation is caused by one or more of the following: (1) 
the lack of a serious relevant problem; (2) significant disagreement on economic policy; or (3) a 
perception that participants are not likely to implement their sides of agreements. 
It is important to note here that specification of the configurational model as a causal model means 
not only that it must be based on a plausible causal account, namely that the existence of relevant 
problems will lead to pressure to introduce policy concertation but that policy concertation will only 
occur in practice if there is also a degree of shared economic understanding and a perception that 
prospective participants will implement their sides of any agreements reached, but also that changes 
in the dependent variable ± the creation or termination of broad policy concertation ± must be 
preceded by changes in the configurations of independent variables. 
THE CONFIGURATIONAL MODEL APPLIED  
Aristotle pointed out long ago that investigators can only expect to reach the degree of precision 
appropriate to the subject matter at hand. In this case precision is limited by difficulties in accurately 
measuring the relevant variables. For example, there may be secret agreements between 
governments, employers and unions about which researchers know nothing. Similarly, it is difficult 
to identify exactly when governments see problems as being relevant and significant. It is also 
difficult to determine exactly how much economic agreement constitutes a significant degree of 
economic agreement, and the extent to which actors believe that implementation of agreements is 
likely.  
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The best that can be done in these circumstances is to rely upon the evaluations of country experts, 
on the basis that such experts have some idea even if it is not completely accurate. For this reason 
the empirical findings on which this study is based must be interpreted as giving us a somewhat 
IX]]\ SLFWXUH RI WKH UHDO VLWXDWLRQ DQDORJRXV WR D GULYHU¶V YLHZ RI WKH URDG DKHDG WKURXJK D ZHW
windscreen. To reject this degree of precision as being inadequate is to reject this type of 
investigation altogether, along with a great deal of other mainstream social science research. 
To evaluate the explanatory power of the configurational theory, the postwar history of the incidence 
of broad policy concertation in 9 West European countries was examined to determine the extent to 
which it is consistent with the predictions of the theory concerning the incidence of the causal 
factors specified by the theory. The remainder of this article sets out the findings of this examination 
in the form of a brief history of broad policy concertation and its correlates in the nine countries 
between 1945 and 1997. The countries covered are Austria, Britain, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands, Spain (after the return of democracy in 1975) and Sweden. 
This history is based mainly on the relevant chapters of the volume that sets out the results of the 
international study of policy concertation mentioned earlier, plus subsequent consultations with their 
authors (Berger and Compston 2002) 2, supplemented by information from other sources where 
indicated in the text. Although the study itself deals with the entire 20th century up to 1997, for 
reasons of space, clarity and contemporary relevance the analysis here is restricted to the postwar 
period 1945-1997.  
The policy concertation volume includes, for each country, a historical study of the period up to 
1990 and a political study of the period since 1990, each carried out by one or more country experts. 
Although these country studies were not undertaken for the specific purpose of testing the 
configurational theory, they do employ the same definition of policy concertation as that used here 
and reveal a great deal about the incidence of policy concertation over the course of the 20th century. 
They also provide causal analyses that include information about the causal factors posited by the 
configurational theory. Although these analyses often cite other factors as being causally relevant in 
addition to (or instead of) those examined here, for the purposes of this analysis these other factors 
are disregarded, as we are testing whether the incidence of broad policy concertation can be 
adequately explained without reference to them.  
Where the authors of country studies do not mention the hypothesised causal factors, their values 
(null values) are assumed for the purposes of this analysis to be as follows. Where no problem is 
mentioned, it is assumed that no serious relevant problem exists. Where the degree of shared 
economic understanding between the political actors is not mentioned, it is assumed that this 
remains unchanged from previous periods. Where implementation problems are not mentioned, it is 
assumed that participants expect that others are reasonably likely to implement their sides of any 
agreements reached. 
The policy concertation study as a whole shows that in terms of the frequency, breadth and duration 
of national-level policy concertation during the period 1945-1997, the nine countries surveyed can 
be classified into three groups: high concertation countries (Austria, the Netherlands and Sweden), 
medium concertation countries (Britain, Ireland, Italy and Spain), and low concertation countries 
(France and Germany), as detailed in Table 2. Readers should bear in mind here that policy 
concertation means the co-determination of public policy and not consultation, however extensive or 
influential consultation has been in countries such as Germany. 
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Table 2. Incidence of Policy Concertation 1945-1997 
Country Significant episodes of policy concertation 
High concertation countries 
Austria  Social Partnership from 1950s 
Sweden Combination of top-level negotiations, representation on executive agencies and 
participation in policy-making commissions 1930s to 1992 
Netherlands Postwar policy concertation to early 1980s; 1989 Common Course Agreement 
Medium concertation countries 
Britain Social Contract 1974-79 
Ireland  Incomes policy agreements of 1970s; social pacts from 1987 
Italy  1969-µFRQIOLFW-QHJRWLDWLRQ¶SROLF\FRQFHrtation; periodic social pacts from 
1978 
Spain Broad social pacts of late 1970s and early 1980s; narrow social pacts 1994-97  
Low concertation countries 
France  1968 Grenelle Accords 
Germany 1993 Solidarity Pact 
Source: Berger and Compston 2002, country chapters. 
 
If the theory is valid, we would expect that the historical record will show that the creation of broad 
policy concertation is preceded by a government perception that there is a relevant problem which 
current policy measures are failing to solve, at a time when there is already significant pre-existent 
agreement on the broad aims and mechanisms of economic policy (at a minimum, acceptance of 
both capitalism and collective bargaining) plus a pre-existent perception that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that any agreements struck will be implemented. The lack of any one of these is expected 
to prevent the coming into being of broad policy concertation. 
The persistence of broad policy concertation is expected to be associated with the perceived problem 
being solved or disappearing, while a significant degree of economic agreement continues and the 
policy actors retain confidence in the likelihood of implementation of agreements. If the problem 
persists, policy concertation has failed and we would not expect policy concertation to continue. 
Neither would it be expected to persist if either of the other factors were absent. 
Accordingly, termination of broad policy concertation is expected to be preceded either by failure to 
solve the relevant problem, or by the emergence of significant disagreement on economic policy, or 
the emergence of doubts about future implementation of agreements.  
And the non-existence of broad policy concertation is expected to be associated with either the lack 
of a relevant problem, or lack of significant economic agreement, or doubts about the 
implementation of possible agreements. 
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It can be seen that although the persistence or non-existence of broad policy concertation has to be 
hypothesised to be coincident with specific configurations of the independent variables, which 
makes it difficult to determine whether these configurations are causal factors or merely correlates 
of the dependent variable, changes in the dependent variable ± creation or termination of broad 
policy concertation ± are hypothesised to follow changes in the configurations of independent 
variables, consistent with these configurations being causal factors but not consistent with their 
being mere correlates of changes in the dependent variable. All claims in the following account 
about the consistency (or otherwise) of empirical observations with the configurational theory 
adhere rigidly to this rule. 
1. 1945-late 1960s 
The entrenchment of broad policy concertation in Sweden and its establishment in Austria and the 
Netherlands during the two decades following the end of World War II can be readily explained in 
terms of the configurational theory. 
In Sweden, alone among our nine countries, broad policy concertation had been established before 
the war. This can be explained in terms of the configurational theory by the fact that only in Sweden 
did a significant degree of economic agreement, one of the prerequisites for policy concertation 
according to the theory, come into being prior to World War II. After they came to power in 1932 in 
the midst of the Depression, the Social Democrats, who had shelved plans for nationalisation and 
accepted capitalism and the need for international competitiveness following their defeat in the 1928 
µ&RVVDFN HOHFWLRQ¶ EURDGHQHG WKH Vcope of the existing narrow policy concertation by instituting 
regular top-level negotiations between government and interest organisations and extending the 
representation of these organisations on the governing boards of the semi-autonomous 
administrative agencies that implement most public policy in Sweden. The bipartite Saltsjöbaden 
$JUHHPHQW RI  GHPRQVWUDWHG WKDW HPSOR\HUV DQG XQLRQV DFFHSWHG HDFK RWKHU¶V H[LVWHQFH DQG
legitimacy, while the high degree of organisation of Swedish employers and unions facilitated 
implementation of agreements.  
After the war, during which broad policy concertation had continued, its existence was briefly 
threatened in the late 1940s by Social Democratic proposals for a planned economy, but these were 
dropped following the 1948 election and representatives of employers and trade unions were 
increasingly included in policy-making commissions, which aimed at reaching agreed positions on 
legislative proposals, and on the governing boards of administrative agencies. Between 1949 and 
1955 ministers and civil servants met weekly with representatives of business, unions and farmers to 
discuss and arguably decide economic policy, and top-level consultation continued even after these 
weekly meetings ceased. This can be readily explained in terms of the configurational theory. The 
HFRQRPLFVXFFHVVRIWKLVSHULRGZDVDWWULEXWHGODUJHO\WRWKHµ6ZHGLVKPRGHO¶RIZKLFKEURDGSROLF\
concertation was an integral part, meaning that it was perceived to have largely solved the problems 
which it was created to solve, and a common economic understanding had been established aimed at 
economic growth via allowing the capitalist economy to operate freely. In addition, all policy actors, 
including the unions, accepted the need for wage restraint. Finally, the inclusive and centralised 
nature of employer and union organisations meant that their leaders could deliver on 
implementation.  
Moves in Austria towards broad policy concertation began early in the postwar period, when Soviet 
occupation of a third of the country contributed to a shared view that conflict had to be avoided. 
This meant acceptance of capitalism by trade unions and acceptance of unions and collective 
bargaining by employers. Employers also accepted economic planning and large-scale state 
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intervention in the economy, including nationalisation of key industrial sectors. In addition, strong 
institutions capable of implementing agreements (the Chambers of Business and Labour, plus a 
single, centralised trade union confederation) were established (or re-established) between 1945 and 
1947. However actual policy concertation was fitful until 1957, when concertation on a widening 
range of economic and social issues commenced in a temporary Parity Commission at a time of 
rising inflation, skilled labour shortages and strikes. By this time economic views had converged 
HYHQ IXUWKHU 7KH SHUFHLYHG VXFFHVV RI WKH 3DULW\ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V LQLWLDO HFRQRPLF SURJUDP ZDV
followed by its being made permanent in 1963, which established policy concertation as the 
dominant policy-making style in Austria (see also Tálos and Kittel 1996).  
The establishment in the Netherlands of a set of corporatist institutions designed in part as forums 
for policy concertation was largely motivated by the felt urgency of postwar reconstruction and 
preceded by growing shared economic understanding. Implementation was not seen as a serious 
SUREOHP,QWKHWULSDUWLWH6RFLDODQG(FRQRPLF&RXQFLOEHFDPHWKHJRYHUQPHQW¶VSDUDPRXQW
advisor on economic and social questions: where recommendations were agreed, these were almost 
invariably accepted by the government. The common understanding of the aims and mechanisms of 
economic policy was based on the development during the war of a shared conviction that 
cooperative industrial relations, which implies the acceptance by all political actors of both 
capitalism and collective bargaining, was indispensable for postwar reconstruction, along with wage 
restraint and a prominent role for the government. As in Austria, the perceived success of the 
economic policy that emerged was followed by the entrenchment of broad policy concertation.  
The lack of broad policy concertation in France, Italy, Germany and Ireland during this period can 
also be explained in terms of the configurational theory. 
Although the postwar system of planning in France was supposed to have been based on tripartite 
concertation in institutions such as Planning Commissions, in fact it was state-driven and trade 
unions were marginalised. The tripartite Economic and Social Council designed to be consulted on 
draft social legislation also failed to operate as a forum for policy concertation. However the 1940s 
did see the establishment of social security funds managed jointly by employers and trade unions. 
The failure to establish broader policy concertation can be explained in terms of the theory by the 
domination of the trade union movement by communists, as this meant that a significant degree of 
shared economic understanding between governments, employers and unions, one of the 
preconditions for broad policy concertation, did not exist.  
The lack of broad policy concertation in Italy during this period, despite the creation of institutions 
designed at least partly for this purpose, can also be explained by the lack of common economic 
understanding consequent on communists being powerful in the trade union movement. At the same 
time, however, a convention was established in the 1950s that all industrial relations legislation 
must be acceptable to both employers and unions (see also Ferner and Hyman 1992: 533, 540). 
The failure of West German governments to introduce broad policy concertation during the two 
decades after 1945 can be explained in terms of the configurational theory mainly by doubts about 
the capacity of the peak union confederation DGB to deliver wage restraint in return: only its 
constituent unions were empowered to conduct wage bargaining but these unions were very resistant 
to any infringement of free collective bargaining. In addition, when the Federal Republic was 
HVWDEOLVKHGLQQHZDSSURDFKHVZHUHDOUHDG\EHLQJWULHGWRWDFNOH*HUPDQ\¶VVHULRXVHFRQRPLF
SUREOHPV QDPHO\ WKH FXUUHQF\ UHIRUP RI  DQG µVRFLDO PDUNHW¶ LGHDV %HFDXVH LW ZDV QRW \HW
clear whether these policies would work, they could not be blamed for failing to cope with the 
economic problems, so another of the conditions for policy concertation was absent as well. By the 
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early 1950s the postwar economic boom was under way, again leaving no incentive for the 
government to switch from existing modes of policy-making. Finally, until the mid-1950s there 
were considerable differences in economic views on issues such as nationalisation, planning and 
codetermination. Still, during the 1940s and 1950s regular and wide-ranging consultation was 
institutionalised at all levels (see also Hardach 1976: 158-60, Markovits : 1986, esp. p.27).  
In Ireland the situation was to some extent conducive to policy concertation, as there were severe 
economic problems and the views of employers and trade unions were not as polarised as elsewhere. 
Its absence can be explained in terms of the configurational theory by the fact that confidence in the 
likelihood of implementation of any agreements reached was undermined by the continuing inability 
of trade unions to coordinate collective bargaining. 
In relation to Britain, however, it is not clear that the configurational theory is wholly persuasive. 
The lack of postwar broad policy concertation in Britain during this period, despite considerable 
agreement on economic policy and the precedent of effective policy concertation during the war, can 
be explained in terms of the theory by the fact that expectations of implementation were undermined 
by the inability of the peak employer and union confederations to guarantee the compliance of their 
constituent organisations with any agreements reached at national level. Middlemas argues that 
shop-floor resistance prevented union agreement to wage restraint between 1950 and 1965. On the 
other hand, union agreement to the 1948-50 wage freeze suggests that implementation problems did 
not rule out policy concertation at that time, which means that its absence is problematic for the 
configurational theory. Employers and unions did gain representation on a host of consultative and 
advisory committees during this period. In the mid-1960s the perceived failure of British economic 
policy, combined with a shared perception that French indicative planning was a success, led to the 
establishment of the tripartite National Economic Development Council in 1962 to set targets for 
production and influence pay awards, but this remained consultative only. An apparent window of 
opportunity in the mid-1960s for the government to exchange policy concertation for wage restraint 
coincided with an upsurge of shop floor militancy, and was closed shortly thereafter when an 
attempt by the Labour government to extend legal regulation to trade unions and collective 
bargaining led to serious conflict with the unions (see also Middlemas 1979: 405, 410, 433-44, 
Clegg 1994: 427). 
2. The late 1960s to late 1980s 
After the relative calm and economic prosperity of the two decades following World War II, the next 
two decades were more troubled. One result was the appearance of broad policy concertation in 
several countries in which it had been mostly or wholly absent - Britain, France, Ireland, Italy and 
Spain - at the same time as its efficacy was coming into question in two of the three countries in 
which it had been most important: the Netherlands and Sweden. In Austria, broad policy 
concertation in the form of the Social Partnership continued, while in Germany it continued to be 
non-existent despite the prominence of elaborate consultative mechanisms such as Concerted 
Action. Almost all of these developments can be explained in terms of the configurational theory.3 
The lack of policy concertation under the 1970-74 Conservative government in Britain, despite 
attempts to negotiate agreements in the latter part of this period, can be explained by lack of a 
common economic understanding, as the Conservatives viewed trade unions as obstacles to good 
economic management and were seeking to limit their power via legislation. The economic views of 
the Labour government elected in 1974, which did not continue the attempts to regulate industrial 
relations that had poisoned relations with the unions in the 1960s, were considerably closer to those 
of the unions. While the high inflation of the early 1970s constituted a problem for which policy 
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concertation was an obvious possible solution, the establishment of broad policy concertation in 
1974 in the form of a Social Contract between the government and unions is somewhat problematic 
for the configurational theory in that there was little confidence at the time in the ability of union 
leaders to deliver wage restraint in return for policy concertation. In the event, however, the unions 
did deliver a considerable degree of wage restraint up to 1978, when union leaders were unable to 
secure the acceptance by their members of the latest agreement, resulting in the industrial action of 
the so-called Winter of Discontent of 1978-79. However it should be noted that another agreement 
was signed in early 1979, so that broad policy concertation in Britain was not in fact terminated until 
after the Conservatives returned to power in May 1979 with an economic policy that denied the 
utility and legitimacy of trade unions and collective bargaining. 
Policy concertation in France took a completely different and unexpected path, and one that does not 
fit the configurational theory. Despite a continuing lack of shared economic understanding between 
the government and employers, on the one side, and unions, on the other, the events of May 1968 
led to efforts by Prime Minister Pompidou and employers to secure an end to the biggest wave of 
strikes and demonstrations in 20th century French history by negotiating the so-called Grenelle 
Accords with the trade unions. (This pattern of massive social unrest followed by a negotiated 
agreement is similar to the sequence of events leading up to the Matignon Agreement of June 1936.) 
Although in 1968 the subsequent agreement with the unions was not actually signed by the union 
leaders, its contents having been rejected by the rank and file, which illustrates the inability of 
French trade unions to deliver their sides of agreements, the Gaullist government still implemented 
its provisions on increasing the minimum wage and reducing social security charges. Occupations 
and barricades continued in the first half of June but then faded away, and no more policy 
concertation took place (see also Bernstein 1993: 218-219). In fact no real broad policy concertation 
took place for the remainder of the period despite the occurrence of high-SURILOH µVXPPLWV¶ IURP
time to time. This lack of concertation is in line with the prediction of the configurational theory that 
a lack of shared economic understanding, and doubts about the implementation capacity of one or 
more policy actors, prevents the occurrence of broad policy concertation. 
The massive social unrest of the late 1960s in Italy also led to broad policy concertation despite not 
only a lack of shared economic understanding among the policy actors but also a persistent lack of 
government implementation of the resultant agreements. Labour unrest beginning in 1968 included a 
national strike to demand higher pensions, which were granted in February 1969. Between 1969 and 
1972 further massive strikes, rallies and marches in support of reform proposals led via negotiation 
to righWV DW WKH ZRUNSODFH EHLQJ JXDUDQWHHG E\ ODZ LQ WKH :RUNHUV¶ &KDUWHU RI 0D\  SOXV
agreements between the unions and the government on tax, housing, health, education, transport, 
and investment in the South, but these were seldom properly implemented by the government. 
Unions were also given seats on an increasing number of administrative agencies in economic and 
social areas. Once labour militancy started to subside after 1972, however, significant policy 
concertation came to an end (see also Ginsborg 1988: 309-331, Barkan 1984: 68-97, Regini 1980). 
In 1977 policy concertation resumed, this time in response to economic problems, and continued on 
and off for the next two decades. At first its scope was rather narrow - agreements on industrial 
restructuring and youth unemployment in 1977, and on training and pensions in 1978 - but in 1983 a 
broad social pact was agreed that covered tax and government charges, employment, health, social 
welfare and development of the South. In 1984 the trade union movement split over whether to 
accept a package involving policy concessions in exchange for cuts in wage indexation, but 
narrower agreements on tax, pensions, employment and the minimum wage were reached in the 
second half of the decade. The rise of broad policy concertation in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
 13 
can be explained in terms of the configurational theory in that this coincided with a worsening of the 
economic situation, a broadening of the area of shared economic understanding after the unions 
accepted the need for wage restraint and labour flexibility in the late 1970s, and improved chances 
of implementation due to the increased unity of the union movement. On the other hand, the 
configurational theory would predict that low expectations of government implementation of its side 
of bargains, based on its poor record in this respect, would deter unions from participating in policy 
concertation, but instead we see repeated attempts to reach agreements. Although union doubts 
about the prospects of adequate government implementation were a factor in the breakdown of 
broad policy concertation in 1984, it is generally agreed that the main cause of its collapse was the 
extension to the trade union movement of party rivalry between the Socialists (supported by the 
Christian Democrats) and the Communists (see also Ferner and Hyman 1992: 541-542).  
In short, the cases of France in 1968 and Italy during this whole period are somewhat anomalous 
from the point of view of the configurational theory. A possible partial explanation is that the 
problem that motivated broad policy concertation in both France and Italy in the late 1960s, massive 
social unrest, was rather different to the economic problems prominent elsewhere where broad 
policy concertation took place. In other words, the causal dynamics of broad policy concertation may 
be different where social unrest is the relevant problem, so that the configurational theory does not 
apply. 
The remaining countries do fit the configurational model. 
In Ireland, economic problems had persisted throughout the postwar period but it was not until the 
economic views of governments, employers and trade unions converged somewhat, and centralised 
collective bargaining simplified the problem of implementing wage agreements after 1970, that 
policy concertation emerged when the government began to facilitate annual wage agreements by 
offering budgetary concessions. The agreements of 1977 and 1978 were explicitly tripartite in 
nature, and the National Understandings of 1979 and 1980 contained separate sections for wages 
and public policy. However the persistence of economic problems led to disillusionment with the 
new system and, in accord with the predictions of the configurational theory in such circumstances, 
broad policy concertation came to an end in 1982, the precipitating event being a change of 
government.  
6SDLQ¶V VLWXDWLRQ LQ WKH SRVWZDU SHULRG ZDV IXQGDPHQWDOO\ GLIIHUHQW WR WKDW RI WKH RWKHU QLQH
FRXQWULHVLQWKDWLWZDVRQO\DIWHU)UDQFR¶VGHDWKLQWKDWWKHFRXQWU\PRYHGWRZDrds democracy. 
Nevertheless, the social pact based policy concertation that emerged after 1975 can be explained in 
terms of the configurational theory. First, not only were there economic problems to motivate 
consideration of broad policy concertation, but also a fear of a reversion to dictatorship that led the 
political actors to take great care to avoid social unrest. This meant serious efforts to reach 
agreement on controversial issues, including public policy issues. Second, the area of shared 
economic understanding was much greater than when policy concertation had last been tried in the 
1930s, and included agreement on the need for wage restraint. This period of broad policy 
concertation came to an end in the early 1980s following implementation problems plus a 
divergence of economic views as the government and employers, but not unions, displayed 
increased interest in deregulation. At the same time the solidification of Spanish democracy 
removed the fear of a return to authoritarian rule.  
Meanwhile the Austrian Social Partnership continued to thrive on economic success. However 
policy concertation in both the Netherlands and Sweden ran into trouble during the 1970s as new 
economic problems arose and the economic views of employers, unions and governments diverged.  
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In the Netherlands, the economic views of employers and unions were diverging by the end of the 
1960s, with employers taking a more laissez-faire line while unions demanded industrial democracy. 
By the 1970s the Social and Economic Council was no longer able to deliver meaningful unanimous 
recommendations to the government: policy concertation was paralysed, and from 1982 the 
government deliberately bypassed the Council for economic advice. Although the bipartite 
Wassenaar Accord of the same year led to increased employer-union cooperation, and over the next 
decade a measure of economic agreement reappeared at a time when economic difficulties continued 
to be severe, an attempt at resuming broad policy concertation in 1989 with the Common Course 
Agreement was not sustained because employers did not believe that the terms of the Agreement 
had been adequately implemented, and refused to enter into new negotiations. 
In Sweden, the economic views of the political actors had started to diverge in certain areas as early 
DV WKH ODWHVDQGJURZLQJXQLRQUDGLFDOLVPFXOPLQDWHG LQ WKHVZLWK WKH0HLGQHU3ODQ¶V
proposal gradually to transfer ownership of industry from private capital to union-controlled 
investment funds. This was interpreted by employers as a deadly threat, and in the 1980s they moved 
towards a neo-liberal economic position and began a massive ideological counterattack even though 
the watered-down version of the Meidner Plan that was eventually legislated did not pose any threat 
to capitalism in Sweden. In the meantime the Social Democratic governments of the 1980s 
increasingly came into conflict with the unions on economic policy. By the late 1980s ideological 
polarisation had led to virtual deadlock in policy concertation. 
As indicated earlier, the absence of policy concertation in postwar Germany can be explained in 
terms of the configurational theory not only by the relative economic success of the 1950s and early 
1960s but also by the inability of the peak union confederation to deliver wage restraint due to its 
lack of authority over wage bargaining coupled with strong member resistance to any interference in 
free collective bargaining. The continuing strength of this resistance was made quite clear by the 
wildcat strikes of 1969, and its persistence explains the lack of broad policy concertation in 
Germany during this period. Although the economic situation deteriorated in 1966, and the area of 
shared economic understanding  between the policy actors broadened once the Social Democrats 
replaced the anti-union FDP in government with the Christian Democrats the same year, the so-
FDOOHG µ&RQFHUWHG $FWLRQ¶ HVWDEOLVKHG LQ  ZKLFK ODVWHG XQWLO  GLG QRW FRQVWLWXWH SROLF\
concertation, despite its name, because agreements on public policy were not part of its remit. In 
DGGLWLRQWKHQHZJRYHUQPHQW¶VDSSOLFDWLRQRI.H\QHVLDQWHFKQLTXHVLQWKHPLG-1960s was followed 
by a resurgence of economic growth, reducing the incentive to engage in policy concertation. The 
more serious economic problems of the 1970s and 1980s were addressed by a turn to austerity rather 
than to policy concertation, reducing the area of shared economic understanding with the unions (see 
also Markovits 1986: 116-117).  
3. From the  late 1980s to 1997 
Developments in policy concertation during the decade since 1987 can without exception be 
explained in terms of the configurational theory. 
The three countries in which policy concertation was most important during this period were 
Austria, Ireland and Italy. 
Although the relevance of the Social Partnership for decision-making in Austria declined somewhat, 
it remained important in many policy areas right up to 1997. This persistence of broad policy 
concertation occurred in the context of an economic performance that compares favourably with 
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most other West European countries, plus continued broad consensus on the aims of economic 
policy and continued consistent implementation.  
The resumption of broad policy concertation in Ireland in 1987, in the form of the first of a series of 
three-year tripartite agreements with provisions on a wide range of public policy, is also in line with 
WKHWKHRU\,UHODQG¶VHFRQRPLFSUREOHPVKDGQRWEHHQVROYHGE\WHUPLQDWLQJSROLF\FRQFHUWDWLRQLQ
1982 while the shared understanding of the aims and mechanisms of economic policy had broadened 
further during the 1980s and now included agreement on the need for wage restraint. 
Implementation does not appear to have been seen as a serious problem. Since 1987 broad policy 
concertation has become well-established in a variety of different forums as the country has 
experienced an unprecedented period of economic success. 
The resurgence of social pact based policy concertation in Italy during the early 1990s can also be 
readily explained: economic problems were joined by political crisis at the same time as the views of 
the political actors converged further on a common understanding of economic objectives and 
mechanisms, while potential implementation problems were reduced by improvements in the 
capacity of the Italian government to deliver on commitments made, plus increased cooperation 
among the three trade union confederations. The persistence of periodic broad policy concertation 
during this period has been accompanied by a widespread view WKDW ,WDO\¶VVXEVWDQWLDOSURJUHVV LQ
tackling its economic problems in recent years can be at least in part attributed to the social pacts of 
1992, 1993 and 1995. 
In most of the other six countries, policy concertation was restricted mainly to employment and 
social policy.  
Since the failure of the tripartite Common Course agreement of 1989, the prospects for further broad 
policy concertation in the Netherlands have been impeded by continuing disagreement over 
economic and social policy plus the fact that the abandonment of broad policy concertation has been 
accompanied by considerable economic success.  
In Sweden, decades of policy concertation in the form of organisational representation in the 
decision-making of administrative agencies came to an end in 1992 when the centre-right Bildt 
government replaced union representatives with lay members selected, at least officially, for their 
expertise. This followed the unilateral withdrawal of employer representatives in 1991. The only 
significant policy-making institutions in which this de-concertation process did not occur were 
pension funds and the Labour Market Board. Other forms of broad policy concertation had already 
come to an end. From the perspective of the configurational theory this development is hardly 
surprising, as broad policy concertation had already been virtually paralysed by the divergent 
economic views of employers and unions, with employers increasingly criticising the economic role 
of trade unions and collective bargaining even after the unions drew back from their radicalism of 
the 1970s and early 1980s. However it was not until the arrival of an economic crisis in the early 
1990s, which policy concertation had been unable to prevent, plus the election of a government that 
saw unions and collective bargaining as an obstacle to economic recovery, that the coup de grace 
was delivered. 
In Germany, on the other hand, where policy concertation had been restricted to certain areas of 
social insurance, labour law and health, the severe economic and social problems created by 
reunification led to short-term broad policy concertation in the form of the 1993 Solidarity Pact. 
What appears to have happened here, viewed through the prism of the configurational theory, is that 
union opposition to interference in free collective bargaining was temporarily lessened in the face of 
such an obvious national crisis, thus briefly removing the constraint that had blocked the 
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establishment of broad policy concertation in previous years. Once the immediate crisis was past, 
however, this opposition to including wage restraint in negotiations with the government reasserted 
itself. 
In Spain, the broad social pacts of the late 1970s and early 1980s were not repeated, following 
disillusionment with their poor implementation in a context of continuing disagreement on 
economic policy, although major reforms to labour law and social security were accomplished by a 
number of social pacts between 1994 and 1997 that included the government either as a formal 
participant or as the author of legislation needed to implement their policy contents.  
In France, governments, employers and trade unions still lack a shared understanding of the goals 
and mechanisms of economic policy, and policy concertation remains restricted to social security 
and labour law.  
There was just one country in which no policy concertation of any sort occurred: Britain, where all 
forms of policy concertation were extinguished by the vehemently anti-union Conservative 
government of 1979-1997. Although the economic views of the new Labour government in 1997 
were substantially closer to those of the unions, the economic upturn that took place during the late 
1990s meant that there was no impetus to switch policy-making styles. In addition, the memory of 
the Winter of Discontent maintains the view that trade unions would have problems implementing 
their side of any bargains.  
CONCLUSION 
The configurational theory of policy concertation posits that the incidence of broad policy 
concertation between governments, employers and unions is a function of the specific configurations 
of just three variables: perceived problems, the degree of pre-existent shared economic 
understanding between policy actors, and their expectations in relation to implementation. The 
results of the above survey of nine West European countries between 1945 and 1997 substantially 
confirm this view. There are just a handful of cases of broad policy concertation (or its absence) that 
are not adequately explained: Britain during the late 1940s and in 1974, France in 1968, and Italy 
during the period 1967-84. 
Further work is obviously needed if a theory with one hundred per cent explanatory success is to be 
constructed, but in the meantime the substantial explanatory success of the configurational theory 
means that it constitutes a powerful device for understanding the causal dynamics of policy 
concertation. No other theory of policy concertation has such explanatory power in relation to so 
many countries over such a long period of time.  
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 NOTES 
 
1
  This article develops the theory first set out in my final chapter in Berger and Compston 2002. I 
gratefully acknowledge the financial support given by the European Commission for this project, 
and the useful comments of three anonymous referees.  
 
2
 The countries examined, and the authors of the historical and political chapters respectively, are 
Austria (Jill Lewis, and Bernhard Kittel and Emmerich Talos), Britain (Chris Williams and Peter 
Dorey), France (Susan Milner and Nick Parsons), Germany (Stefan Berger and Jeremy Leaman), 
,UHODQG(PPHW2¶&RQQRUDQG'DPLHQ7KRPDVDQG5RU\2¶'RQQHOO,WDO\*LQR%HGDQLDQG
Bruce Haddock), the Netherlands (Anton Hemerijck and Hans Slomp), Spain (Robert Robinson and 
Miguel Martinez Lucio), and Sweden (James Fulcher and Victor Pestoff). 
 
3
 Information in this and the following section is also drawn from Compston 1995. 
